PART I : The Dilemma of the "Great Debate"

• Chapter I: The Two Senses of "Argument"

Two senses of an argument might be distinguished. Formal logic, which rigorously demonstrates the conclusion, could be called "Sense II"; and "Sense I" could denote the special evaluative type of argument, which does not intend to demonstrate the conclusion, and is used in giving (probably inadequate) intellectual backing to decisions about ''what should be taught." We may also speak of Senses I and II as the "intentional" and "'successful" uses (respectively) of the word "'answer." Although these are not, strictly speaking, the same as "response" and "solution'' in the question-answer relation, a successful answer is a solution to a problem or question; an unsuccessful answer may "intend" to solve the problem but is no solution.

The Purist criterion thus seems to exclude many arguments, metaphysical and moral, that ought to be included; the Capricious use of argument, by contrast, includes many arguments that we should have some way of excluding, and yet we have none. Whereas the Purist use of argument would indiscriminately eliminate all evaluative arguments in education, the Capricious use of argument indiscriminately admits them all. The Purist, in short, eliminates too much; the Capricious admits too much. It follows, then, that neither the Purist nor the Capricious use of argument provides a satisfactory basis for judging evaluative arguments in education.

• Chapter II: The Use of Metaphysical Arguments in Education

A metaphysical argument in education is said to be settled by an educational definition or by a metaphysical belief. Either way, an argument is given—although not in the sense of "argument'7 that is being sought. A metaphysical question answered either by definition or by metaphysical belief is answered in the persuasive rather than the demonstrable sense of argument. Two approaches, the derivative and the constructive, show how metaphysical beliefs are used to ''settle'' educational arguments. With both, however, the philosophy of X can only be said to imply an argument to answer Y in one sense, although quite another sense of "answer"' is being sought. 

Examination of metaphysical arguments in education illuminates an obstacle to ''settling'' such arguments that perhaps was formerly not recognized. The effort has been made to show the essential difficulty that arises when they are "settled" by definition or belief. In either case, misgiving arises when the sense of intent in the word "argument" is shifted to the sense of success ("solution" 40 or "'conclusion"). (If one supposes that one has established the certainty of one's conclusion to an educational argument, in the sense that one establishes the certainty of an answer or solution to a question, then one is misapplying an educational argument in one of the senses of "argument" that does not in fact apply it. This indistinguishability between two senses in some philosophers' minds tempts one to repeat Wittgenstein's remark that "one can only stammer about such things."")

Understanding how a metaphysical argument answers a metaphysical question may keep Home's question "Can man live adequately in time without thought of Eternity?"; or Heidegger's question "Why is there anything at all?"; or Broudy's question "Are there any truths or principles for all times and places?", from seeming to be foolish, meaningless, 61 The Use of Metaphysical Arguments  unanswerable, or unarguable—so long as one does not confuse one sense of an argument with another.

Metaphysics may in the foregoing sense imply conclusions for education. Noteworthy, however, is that educational definitions and metaphysical beliefs occasionally take on the character of arguments that are Capricious rather than Purist; they are more like persuasive definitions and persuasive implications than like demonstrable arguments, principally because there is more in the conclusion than there was in the premises. The special difficulty with educational definitions and beliefs is that, in being reduced to particular doctrines, they become particular premises used to imply universal conclusions. Thus metaphysical arguments using educational definitions and beliefs are apt to be more like Sense I than Sense II. Is there no way out of the Sense I and Sense II dilemma? Are all our arguments more like Sense I than Sense II? The attempt has been made to reveal that there are no standards for judging metaphysical arguments in education.

• Chapter III: The Use of Moral Arguments

On the basis of these observations, a moral argument is used as was the metaphysical argument—not in the sense of an "'argument" that is rationally defensible. The attempt has been made to show a difficulty that may have been unrecognized, when moral arguments were used in each of three principal efforts in the philosophy of education.22 In these efforts, a basis for misgiving occurs, as it did with the metaphysical argument, when the "intentional" use of the word "argument" shifts into the ''success" use. There is nothing, however, that is foolish about any of these efforts to draw a defensible conclusion to a moral argument, so long as one does not mistake one sense of 'argument" for another. The attempt has not been made to show whether a moral argument can be used but instead to show, in each instance, how a moral argument is used. It has been shown that a moral argument is used more like Sense I, even though it is intended to be used in Sense II (that is, in a rationally defensible way). 

Noting how a moral argument is used may serve as a reminder of the difficulty that results from foregoing the use of an argument in Sense II. Moral arguments are surely not all of the "'peach pie'' kind. Yet the effort to satisfy Sense II comes up against the "is-ought" hurdle, which has not, in any of the instances noted, been surmounted. 

Source: The Place of Reason in Education by Bertram Bondman